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 trial tactics
One Person’s Statement to 
Prove Another’s Actions
BY stEPHEN a. saltZBUrG
It has been long established—since Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892)—that statements of an individual’s 
present intention to do a future act may be ad-
mitted to prove that the individual did in fact do 
the act. Dictum in Hillmon stated that one per-
son’s statement of a present intent to do a future 
act with another person could be used to prove 
that the declarant did the intended act and did 
it with the other person mentioned in the state-
ment. When Congress enacted the Federal Rules 
of Evidence into law in 1975, a House of Repre-
sentatives committee report indicated a desire to 
limit the use of a hearsay statement of a present 
intent to do a future act to prove the declarant’s 
actions, not those of a third person. The Senate 
report was silent on the matter, and whether the 
Hillmon dictum remained good law was not re-
solved as the Federal Rules were enacted into law. 
The hearsay issue of whether to limit use of a 
declarant’s statement of an intention to do a future 
act to prove the declarant’s actions alone or also the 
actions of another person remains alive in both fed-
eral and state courts. Resolution of the hearsay issue 
is more important today than some years ago since 
the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause extends only to 
testimonial statements. (Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004).) Since few statements of a pres-
ent intent to do a future act are testimonial, the only 
protection for a defendant in a criminal case from 
having a declarant’s statements used to prove the 
defendant’s actions is the hearsay rule.
State v. McLaughlin: an illustrative case
The importance of the hearsay rule to resolution 
of this issue is well illustrated by State v. McLaugh-
lin, 14 A.3d 720 (N.J. 2011). The case arose as a 
result of an alleged plan by the defendant, Edu-
ardo McLaughlin, his brother Pablo, and a friend 
named Miguel Serrano to rob a grade-school friend 
of the defendant, Thong Ming Hyunh. Hyunh was 
employed in a check cashing business that often 
transported large sums of cash. The defendant, 
along with the others, arranged for the defendant 
to ride with Hyunh in Hyunh’s sister’s van after 
he picked up approximately $17,000 in cash. The 
two drove to where Pablo lived with his girlfriend. 
When they arrived, Pablo and Serrano were al-
ready there. A struggle ensued while the money 
was counted, and the defendant and Serrano killed 
Hyunh and divided the money. The two bought an 
all-terrain vehicle and drove the van to a secluded 
location where they set it on fire before dumping 
Hyunh’s body.
The police responded to the van fire and traced 
the van to the victim’s sister, who reported her 
brother missing the following day. As a result of 
discovering that the defendant and Hyunh had 
several telephone conversations immediately be-
fore Hyunh disappeared, the police interviewed 
the defendant. The defendant said that he and 
Hyunh had planned to go out for drinks, but 
Hyunh had not called back.
The investigation led the police to Serrano. 
They searched Serrano’s home and recovered a 
large sum of cash along with a bracelet identified 
as belonging to Hyunh. Serrano’s girlfriend, Jes-
sica Pabón, told the police that she had seen the 
defendant wearing that bracelet. More cash was 
discovered at the home of Serrano’s mother.
Eduardo McLaughlin was tried alone for first-
degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and 
other crimes. The jury convicted the defendant of 
aggravated manslaughter (as a lesser included of-
fense of murder), felony murder, robbery, hinder-
ing apprehension, and conspiracy.
the Evidence issue
The prosecution called Jessica Pabón as a witness 
and asked her whether Serrano had told her if he 
was planning the robbery with someone else. De-
fense counsel objected, the trial judge overruled 
the objection, and Pabón testified that Serrano 
said that he was planning the robbery with “Ed-
die,” the defendant, and that he and the defendant 
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were going to watch the victim to see what he “did 
throughout the day, something like that.” The trial 
court admitted the testimony as a coconspirator 
declaration. On appeal, the Appellate Division of 
the New Jersey Superior Court held that the co-
conspirator exception was inapplicable because the 
statements were not made in furtherance of the 
planned robbery. That court determined, however, 
that the statements were admissible under the “state 
of mind” exception, New Jersey Rule of Evidence 
803(c)(3). The New Jersey exception is virtually 
the same as Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and 
creates a hearsay exception not conditioned on un-
availability for a “statement made in good faith of 
the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emo-
tion, sensation or physical condition (such as intent, 
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily 
health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the 
defendant’s petition for certification to review 
whether Serrano’s hearsay statements, as testified 
to by Jessica Pabón, were admissible under New 
Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(c)(3).
 
the available approaches
The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the 
state had recognized a “state of mind” exception to 
the hearsay rule in Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495, 
541 (E. & A. 1878), 14 years before Hillmon, and 
Hillmon actually cited Hunter. That is the exception 
codified as New Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(c)(3).
The court looked to what other United States 
courts had done when a declarant’s statement of 
a present intent to do a future act with another 
person is offered against the other person and 
found three general approaches to the problem. 
Some courts narrowly apply Hillmon so that a 
declarant’s statement may only be admitted to 
prove the declarant’s subsequent conduct. Other 
courts take a more expansive approach and uni-
formly allow admission of the statement to prove 
the subsequent conduct of both the declarant and 
nondeclarant in all instances. Still other courts al-
low admission of the statement as proof of the 
subsequent conduct of the nondeclarant if  there 
is independent evidence to corroborate the hear-
say statement as to the nondeclarant.
the Holding
The court reversed the defendant’s convictions 
and held that:
[t]he ‘state of mind’ hearsay exception 
should be construed narrowly, focusing spe-
cifically on the declarant’s state of mind and 
whether that state of mind is directly rele-
vant to the issues at trial. Because the state 
of mind of the declarant of the hearsay of-
fered here was not directly relevant to the 
prosecution of defendant and the hearsay 
statement itself, without redaction, imputed 
to defendant the intent to commit a crime, 
its admission was error.
(McLaughlin, 14 A.3d at 189.)
the reasoning
The court emphasized that the first step in deter-
mining admissibility of a declarant’s statement is 
deciding whether it is relevant. In the instant case, 
the court concluded that Serrano’s statement was 
irrelevant because his state of mind was not at is-
sue in the case. This, by itself, would have been 
sufficient to warrant reversal, but the court indi-
cated a desire to provide clarity for future cases.
Thus, it went on to hold that, even if  relevant, 
a declarant’s statement of a present intention to 
do a future act must be redacted if  it refers to an-
other person against whom the statement is of-
fered. The court reasoned as follows:
This must be so because, as State v. Roach, 
146 N.J. 208, 224, 680 A.2d 634, cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 1021, 117 S. Ct. 540, 136 L. Ed. 
2d 424 (1996), explains, “[i]t is well-settled 
that the admission of the statement of a 
co-defendant at a joint trial that implicates 
defendant without the right of cross-exami-
nation constitutes prejudicial error.” (citing 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. 
Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968); State v. 
Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A.2d 352 (1965)). . . .
If  a hearsay declarant unavailable for cross-
examination directly implicates a defen-
dant, the principles that inform Bruton and 
Roach also guide the redaction process to be 
followed in the context of a state of mind 
hearsay statement that identifies a non-de-
clarant defendant. As this Court has noted, 
“limiting instructions [to the jury] are, as a 
matter of constitutional law, insufficient to 
overcome the prejudice to a remaining de-
fendant in a joint trial in which an unavail-
able codefendant inculpates the remaining 
defendant[.]” State v. Meléndez, 129 N.J. 48, 
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57, 609 A.2d 1 (1992) (citing Bruton, supra, 
391 U.S. at 124, 88 S. Ct. at 1621, 20 L. Ed. 
2d at 478). Therefore, the question becomes 
what—in order to insure fairness in the pro-
ceedings and stout fealty to the constitu-
tional guarantee that a defendant is entitled 
to confront and cross-examine those who 
bear witness against him—must a court do 
in order to redact or “sanitize” a co-defen-
dant’s hearsay statement that implicates the 
non-testifying defendant?
(Id. at 733–34.)
The court’s answer was as follows:
We therefore express what Meléndez, supra, 
129 N.J. at 57–60, 609 A.2d 1, implies: a non-
testifying declarant’s state of mind hearsay 
statement concerning future acts by the non-
declarant/defendant properly must be redact-
ed to omit references to the non-declarant/
defendant in order to satisfy both Evidence 
Rule 803(c)(3) as well as the requirements 
of the Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const. 
amend. VI, and its parallel in the New Jersey 




The court applied its reasoning to the facts of the 
case as follows:
Had Serrano’s hearsay statements been 
offered during Serrano’s own trial, the 
statements would have been admissible as 
against him. See N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) (except-
ing party’s own statements from hearsay 
rule). However, in a trial where defendant 
stands alone, those same statements ad-
dressing Serrano’s state of mind in respect 
of defendant’s possible future acts are not 
relevant to a central issue in the determina-
tion of defendant’s guilt. And, at their core, 
those hearsay statements are unreliable: Ser-
rano’s hearsay statements concerning defen-
dant as offered through Jessica Pabón’s tes-
timony cannot be cross-examined, and the 
absence of an effective substitute for cross-
examination fails to satisfy the “good faith” 
requirement of Evidence Rule 803(c)(3) and 
is fatal to their admissibility. Defendant—
who made no statements of a presently ex-
isting state of mind—cannot otherwise be 
liable vicariously for the statements made 
by Serrano in respect of Serrano’s state of 
mind, particularly where, as here, there was 
no showing that defendant knew of or oth-
erwise ratified Serrano’s hearsay statements. 
As a result, the admission of those hearsay 
statements without redaction and over ob-
jection—thereby allowing the jury to infer 
that Serrano’s hearsay statements proved 
that defendant acted as Serrano claimed to 
his girlfriend—constitutes reversible error 
that commands a retrial.
(Id. at 735–36.)
the reasoning analyzed; some lessons
1. The court was probably wrong in concluding 
that Serrano’s statement of intent was irrelevant in 
the defendant’s trial. Had Serrano testified and ad-
mitted participation, his statement might well have 
been irrelevant. But, assuming that he did not tes-
tify (and the court did not suggest he did), then the 
government was required to prove how the victim 
died, which meant it had to prove that Serrano was 
there with the defendant. Thus, Serrano’s statement 
of a present intention to rob the victim was proba-
tive of the fact that he did actually participate in the 
robbery that led to murder. Even if the statement is 
redacted to remove any mention of the defendant, it 
is relevant to the prosecution’s case.
2. The court’s references to the US Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Bruton as well as the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s own opinions in Roach, Young, 
and Meléndez fail to indicate that all of the opin-
ions preceded the decision in Crawford. It is vir-
tually certain that Serrano’s statements to Jessica 
Pabón were not testimonial statements. Therefore, 
the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause is not 
applicable. Of course, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court may rely on the New Jersey Constitution to 
provide more confrontation rights than are guar-
anteed by the US Constitution. But, it is important 
for readers of the opinion to recognize that redac-
tion is not required by the Sixth Amendment.
3. The fact that the Sixth Amendment con-
frontation clause does not apply drives home the 
point that the hearsay determination is critical. 
If  Serrano’s statements are not admissible under 
evidence rules such as New Jersey Rule of Evi-
dence 803(c) (3) or Federal Rule of Evidence 803 
(3), then redaction is not only appropriate, but re-
quired—not as a result of the application of the 
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Sixth Amendment but as a fair application of the 
hearsay rule. After all, there is no way a limiting 
instruction would work in a case like the instant 
case, given the fact that there is a single defendant 
who is not the hearsay declarant.
4. Those state courts that admit statements 
like Serrano’s—with or without corroboration—
to prove that he acted and did so along with de-
fendant McLaughlin may continue to do so. Af-
ter all, they have the authority to interpret their 
evidence rules as they see fit, and absent a state 
constitutional problem with admission of the 
evidence, the fact that it is nontestimonial means 
that federal law is irrelevant.
5. As for federal courts, they must rely on the 
law of the respective circuit until such time as the 
US Supreme Court decides to decide on the reach 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3). n
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